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The Chinese government has been promulgating the Five-Year Plan (FYP) for economic 
and social development every five years since 1953. Central planning, which used to dominate 
the economic and social life of the general public in China for nearly 30 years since 1949, has 
been regarded as the predominant character of socialism. Since China launched the Reform and 
Opening Policy in 1978, the role of planning has been converted from micro-control of 
individual enterprises to macroeconomic management. Meanwhile, with consciousness of social 
justice increasingly aroused, issues of environment, natural resources, and social welfare, take 
more words than ever in the recently promulgated 11th FYP which was approved by the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) on March 14, 2006.1      
Compared with its predecessors, the 11th FYP attracts much more attention in terms of 
the input of intelligent, financial and social resources as well as widely extended public 
participation.2 It is the first time that a distinction between binding targets and nonbinding targets 
exists. Targets concerning economic development, such as GDP growth rate, are categorized as 
nonbinding targets while those concerning social and environmental development are 
categorized as binding targets, such as population control, energy conservation, environmental 
protection, social security, medical services, etc. The increasing significance of targets 
concerning social and environmental development and the relatively decreasing emphasis on 
economic growth targets underline the determination of the Hu Jintao administration to change 
the role of Chinese government from a “development-oriented government” to a 
“welfare-oriented government”. 
Despite the enormous resources devoted and the introduction of new concepts and 
planning approaches, the actual effect of the plan, however, is at question. As shown by the 
statistical review from National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), during 2006, the first year of the 11th 
five-year term, all the 31 provinces overran the target of GDP growth rate, while few of them 
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1 “The Outline of The Eleventh Five-Year Plan For National Economic and Social Development of the People’s 
Republic of China;” the Official Web Portal of China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 1 
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achieved the targets of major pollutant reduction and energy conservation.3 What is worse, 
during the first quarter of 2007, the growth rate of China’s heavy industry was accelerated, 
among which the six most energy consuming industries grew at an average rate of 20.6%, much 
higher than the average industry growth rate, obviously adding more trouble to realize the targets 
of environment protection and energy conservation. What is wrong with the planning system so 
that the binding targets fail at the first step?  
This research will focus on the targets of energy conservation (energy consumption per 
unit of GDP) and reduction of total discharge of major pollutants (COD and SO2) and then 
explore the plan-making process and plan-implementing process. Based on the theory of 
informal rules, it is argued that, lack of institutional guarantee of the formal rules regulating 
central-local governmental relationships is a key factor contributing to the failure of the planning 
system. In the plan-making process, the discretion authorized to local governments by the formal 
rules has been curtailed informally. As a result, local governments cannot express their real will 
in the plan-making process. In the plan-implementing process, the target responsibility 
mechanism which seemingly is imposed on local governments by the central government more 
responsibility fails to stand firmly on an expectable basis of surveillance. It is concluded that the 
planning system per se with internal conflicts and disorders results in the “plan failure”.   
Analyzing Framework and Target Choosing 
1. Analyzing Framework 
To portray the whole planning system, a matrix framework crossed by two pairs of 
counter-concepts is applied, one is “policy making vs. policy implementation”, and the other is 
“formal rules vs. informal rules”.  
 Policy stage perspective is a widely used conceptual framework in the field of policy 
process research, in which policy process is split into a series of stages, including “the manner in 
which problems get conceptualized and brought to the government for solution; governmental 
institutions formulate alternatives and select policy solutions; and those solutions get 
implemented, evaluated and revised”.4 Among the above stages, policy forming and policy 
implementing matter to this research and they are detailed respectively as the plan making and 
plan implementing.       
The distinction between formal rules and informal rules is a powerful instrument to look 
deeply into the real political institution and policy process. In the field of political science, 
formal rules are defined as the political institution or organizational structure confined by written 
laws while informal rules are those practical or implied “rules of game” followed by the real 
                                                        
23 According to the communiqué released by NBS, emission of COD and SO rises by 1.2% and by 1.8% 
respectively; energy consumption per unit of GDP falls by 1.23%, still a long way to reach the target set down in the 
FYP.      
4 Paul A. Sabatier, Theories of the Policy Process, Westview Press, 1999, p.3. 
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players in the political arena. In this research, they are detailed as rules in words and rules in 
practice, respectively.  
Chart 1. Framework of the Paper 
 Plan Making Plan Implementing 
Formal Rules Bottom-up Negotiation Restrict Responsibility 
Informal Rules Top-down Distritution Uncertain Responsibility 
2. Target Choosing 
Three targets, GDP growth rate, energy conservation and discharge reduction of major 
pollutant, are signalized out of twenty-two targets listed in the 11th FYP. The reason has three 
folds. (1) The target of major pollutant reduction is the only one unrealized during the term of the 
10th FYP5. (2) Targets of energy conservation and major pollutant reduction are among the 
binding ones which indicate the transformation of governmental function. (3) Significant conflict 
between energy and environment targets and GDP growth target to some extent illustrates the 
conflict of interest between central government and local governments. Without a radical change 
of the industry developing model and path, an accelerated growing GDP can never bring along 
less pollutant emission or energy consumption. As rational players in the political arena, central 
government that values a long term regime and social stability tends to pursue a sustainable 
strategy while local governments who face directly daily expenditure pressure tend to pursue the 
maximum of local revenue. Bringing these two groups of targets together and contrasting them is 
a proper avenue to probe the central-local relationship in terms of the planning system.  
Plan Making Process: Top-down or Bottom-up? 
1. Formal rules regulating plan making process 
No legislation exists to date to rule on the substance and procedure of plan making in 
terms of national economic and social development. The State Council has been in charge of 
issuing administrative measures indicating the general principles and basic requirements of a 
specific plan making until the 10th FYP, e.g. “Opinions on Planning Making Approach and 
Procedures of the 10th FYP” (No. 88 [1999] issued by the General Office of the State Council). 
During the period of making the 11th FYP, similar administrative measures are issued by the 
State Council, i.e. “Opinions of the State Council on Enhancing the Procedure of Making the 
Plan of National Economic and Social Development” (No.33 [2005] issued by the State 
Council).6 This circular, different from its predecessors, tends to regulate FYP making as a 
whole instead of concentrating on a specific FYP making process. So it is proper to regard it as 
the formal rule regulating the process of making the FYPs before any other legislation or 
                                                        
5 It is required by the 10th FYP that discharge of COD and SO2 be reduced by 10% respectively. At the end of the 
term, however, discharge of SO2 increased dramatically by 27% in 2005 comparing with in 2000 while discharge of 
COD increased by 5% in 2005 comparing with in 2004. 
6 http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-10/26/content_84417.htm 
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administrative regulation comes out.  
According to Circular 33, the procedures of FYP making at the provincial level are as 
follows. 
(1) Provincial development and reform commission (former planning commission) 
together with provincial bureaus concerned draw up a preliminary draft of the plan;  
(2) Provincial development and reform commission sends the draft to the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), provincial development and reform 
commission in adjacent provinces, and departments concerned in the State Council, 
respectively, to make sure that the provincial plan has no conflict with the national plan, 
provincial plans in adjacent provinces and national special plans;  
(3) Provincial development and reform commission should solicit and accept 
suggestions from special committees in provincial People’s Congress and People's Political 
Consultative Conference;  
(4) Provincial development and reform commission submits the plan to the provincial 
government for examination;  
(5) Provincial government submits the plan protocol to provincial People’s Congress 
for deliberation, approval and promulgation.  
It is explicitly shown that, provincial organs including both government and People’s 
Congress authorized by Circular 33 play key roles in provincial plan- making process while the 
central government is the main coordinator ensuring that the provincial plan is consistent with 
the national plan, with departmental plans, and with each other. Such an institutional 
arrangement gives the provincial government proper space for discretion, allowing them to 
choose development targets consistent with their own local conditions. Meanwhile, necessary 
control power is kept by the central government to adjust provincial targets to keep provincial 
governments marching along the lines of the comprehensive plan. Seemingly, this is a 
province-centered bottom-up approach to planning-making.    
2. Informal rules followed by plan making in Practice 
A further exploration of the real process of plan-making concerning the energy 
conservation target and major pollutant emission reduction target overwhelms the conclusion 
drawn above that plan making follows a bottom-up approach. Actually, the rules in word are just 
part or even a beginning of rules in deed. 
In China, the annual meeting of provincial People’s Congress is held between January 
and March every year, earlier than that of National People’s Congress held in March, which 
means that the FYPs at the provincial level should be promulgated earlier than the national FYP. 
Since the national FYP underlines a macro perspective of the central government, it is hardly a 
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simple accumulation of provincial targets. As a result, the national targets might not turn out to 
be the sum of provincial targets. Take the energy conservation target (ECT) as an example, a 
sum of ECTs at the provincial level can never reach the national target which requires a 20% 
reduction of energy consumption per unit of GDP in the following five years. (“Initial Targets” 
in Table 1) The situation of major pollutant discharge reduction (MPDR) is even more 
disordered. The national target requires a 10% reduction in MPDR in the next 5 years. Data 
bracketed in Table 2 shows that only 19 out of 31 provinces propose their own MPDRs, among 
which only 8 provinces propose MPDRs higher than the national target.  
 




Unit of GDP (%) 
Reduction of Energy 













Hainan -7.5 12 Hebei  20 20 Shandong  22 22 
Guangxi  10 15 Liaoning  20 20 Shanxi  25 25 
Qinghai  10 17 Heilongjiang 20 20 InnerM 25 25 
Kunming  12 17 Shanghai  20 20 Jilin 30 30 
Guangdong  13 16 Jiangsu  20 20 4 provinces 
Tibet 13 12 Jiangxi  20 20 
Beijing  15 20 Henan  20 20 
Tianjin 15 20 Hubei  20 20 
Zhejiang  15 20 Hunan  20 20 
Ningxia  15 20 Chongqing  20 20 
Shaanxi  19 20 Sichuan  20 20 
Fujian  N/A 16 Gansu  20 20 
12 provinces Xinjiang  20 20 
Anhui  20 20 




In accordance with Circular 33, provincial targets should come into effect after approved 
by the provincial People’s Congress. It is far away from the reality, however. During August and 
September, 2006, the State Council rearranges ECTs and MPDRs at the provincial level 
respectively through two administrative circulars. “Reply of the State Council Concerning the 
Plan Controlling Discharge of Major Pollutant” (No. 70 [2006] issued by the State Council]) 
authorizes State Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) and NDRC together to redistribute 
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MPDRs among provinces. The following factors are required to be taken into consideration: (1) 
the national target; (2) local conditions, i.e. environmental quality, environmental capability, 
emission basis, economic development level, and reduction capability; (3) requirement of special 
plans; (4) regional diversity among Eastern, Middle, and Western China. Detailed targets 
redistributed are shown in Table 2. “Reply of the State Council Concerning the Plan Reducing 
Energy Consumption per Unit of GDP among Areas during the 11th FYP term” (No. 94 [2006] 
issued by the State Council) authorizes NDRC to redistribute PECTs among provinces, 
following the criteria that, (1) targets equal to and above 20% should be confirmed; (2) targets 
under 20% should be adjusted according to local economic development level, industry structure, 
gross energy consumption, energy consumption efficiency, energy self-supply capability; (3) 
national target must be guaranteed. Detailed targets redistributed are listed in Column of 
“adjusted targets” in Table 1.  
A series of questions is put forward in terms of central-local relationship in the plan 
making process. To what extent does the central government take into account the wills of 
provincial governments? What is the role of the central government in the plan-making process, 
a coordinator merely or a mandator? A comparison below between targets proposed by provinces 
themselves and those distributed by the central government will give one probable answer to 
these questions.  
Data in Table 1 show how much the provincial targets of energy conservation have been 
changed. For each province, the first number is the percentage of energy consumption reduction 
per unit of GDP approved in the provincial FYP, while the last number is the target adjusted by 
Circular 94. Several observations can be found, (1) the mode of provincial targets is 20% (15 out 
of 31 provinces); (2) all the targets above and equal to 20% have been maintained by the central 
government; (3) all the targets below 20% have been increased by the central government, with 
the only exception of Tibet (from 13% down to 12%). 
How can these observations be properly explained? Although the National FYP has not 
yet come into birth during the period that provincial FYPs are being drafted, the Central 
Committee of China Communist Party (CCP) has promulgated “Suggestions by Central 
Committee of CCP Concerning Constituting the 11th FYP of National Economic and Social 
Development” (“Suggestions”) which explicitly requires a 20% reduction of energy consumption 
per unit of GDP as the target. This is why 15 out of 31 provinces choose 20% as their targets. It 
can be argued that the target of 20% reduction in those 15 provinces’ FYP reflects the obedience 
to the central government instead of provinces’ own wills. As to the targets higher than 20% 
advanced by 4 provinces, it can be argued that these targets mirror their own considerations. It is 
no wonder that these targets are confirmed by the central government since they respond 
affirmatively to the central government’s requirement. As to the 12 provinces whose targets are 
below 20%, the situation is much more complicated. Among them, we can see the developed 
areas such as Guangdong, Beijing, Tianjin and Zhejiang, the backward areas such as Hainan,  
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Hainan  0 0   Chongqing  11.9 11.2   
Tibet  0 0   Sichuan  11.9 (2.9) 5 (9.6 )   
Xinjiang  0 0   Liaoning  12 12.9 (5) 
Qinghai  0 0   Shaanxi  12 10 (5) 
Gansu  0 7.7 (9.5) Shanxi  14 13.2   
Heilongjiang  2 10.3 (10) Henan  14 10.8 (10) 
Inner Mongolia  3.8 6.7   Hebei  15 15.1 (15) 
Anhui  4 6.5 (5) Zhejiang  15(13) 15.1(7)   
Yunnan  4 ( -1) 4.9 (6)   Guangdong  15 15 (10) 
Jilin  4.7/36.4 (34) 10.3/40.7 (34.5)   Guizhou  15 7.1   
Jiangxi  7 5   Jiangsu  18 15.1 (5) (5) 
Hubei  7.8 5 0  Shandong  20 14.9 (10) 
Fujian  8 4.8   Beijing  20.4 14.7   
Hunan  9 10.1 (10) Shanghai  25.9 ( 35) 14.8   
Ningxia 9.3 14.7 (5)     
Tianjin  9.4/24 (24) 9.6       
Guangxi  9.9 12.1       
Guangxi, Qinghai, Yunnan, Tibet, Ningxia, and also those provinces at the middle level such as 
Shaanxi and Fujian. Different considerations are behind different decisions. For economically 
advanced provinces, less progress of reduction can be achieved since the weight of high energy 
consumption industry is not as great as before. For least developing areas, there are two possible 
reasons. One reason is that the current energy consumption level is very low because the industry 
does not overwhelm agriculture; the other is that a strong desire of development requires rapid 
growth of industry which will result in a high increase in energy consumption. As to the two 
middle level provinces, it is hard to speculate their considerations under common sense. 
Generally speaking, the targets proposed by these “laggards” at least reflect their practical and 
realistic attitude. However, the central government cannot bear these lagging targets or the 
nullification of the national targets. As a result, all the provincial targets adjusted by the central 
government are nothing but the reflection of its own will.  
The situation of targets concerning discharge reduction of major pollutant is even more 
complicated. (Table 2). “Suggestions” does not raise any point on the targets of environmental 
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protection in the quantitative way, so provincial FYPs express their targets on major pollutant 
discharge reduction in diverse ways. 19 of 31 provinces write quantitative targets in their FYPs 
which are listed in the brackets of Table 3. For these provinces, three factors are taken into 
account when proposing their targets: (1) the target of 10% advanced in the last 10th National 
FYP; (2) the level of local economic development and the expectation of economic development 
in the next five years; (3) the extent to which the province achieved its target in the last 10th FYP. 
Comparing with the target on energy conservation, this target on major pollutant discharge 
reduction is closer to the real will of provinces. The analysis of the adjusted targets shows that, 
(1) only 3 provinces (Anhui, Tianjin, Hebei) maintain their original targets; (2) 5 provinces 
(Gansu, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Hunan, Shanghai) get their original targets reduced; (3) 9 provinces 
(Hubei, Ningxia, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Hunan, Henan, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong) 
get their original targets increased; (4) the other 2 provinces (Yunnan, Sichuan) get one of their 
targets increased and the other reduced. The disperse distribution of the adjusted targets implies 
that the central government takes little consideration of the will of provincial governments when 
redistributing the targets concerning major pollutant discharge reduction. As mentioned in 
Circular 70, the guiding criterion is to “give different treatment to Eastern, Middle and Western 
Areas respectively”.     
An empirical research on the change of the ECT and MPDR shows that, in the real 
process of plan-making, the local-government-centered, bottom-up approach formally 
established by Circular 33 has actually been replace by a central-government-centered, top-down 
approach. A series of institutional problems will arise accordingly. First, the informal operation 
of formal institutions nullifies provincial governments’ expectation of formal rules. Provinces 
telling the truth get no praise but are regarded as lagging actors. Such a mechanism will 
encourage provincial governments to make targets as close to central government’s expectation 
as possible in the long time gaming. Second, the target of the central government suffers the risk 
of failure to be implemented since it is not established on a firm basis. Third, without real 
participation of provinces in the planning process, counterwork at the provincial level can be 
expected in the plan implementing process. 
Plan Implementing: the Soft Power of Target Responsibility Mechanism. 
It is through the Target Responsibility Mechanism that targets are implemented and 
supervised. SEPA and NDRC, representing the State Council, sign agreements of target 
responsibility with provincial governments concerning environmental protection and energy 
conservation.  Competition of those targets is added to the evaluating criteria of government 
performance of provincial governments. Agreements between the superior government and the 
inferior government are signed in order that the targets are disassembled all the way down to 
local governments. Target responsibility mechanism has been playing an important role in 
China’s government administration especially in the period of the planned economy. Following a 
three-step model including plan making, targets disassembling, and performance evaluating, this 
approach is widely used in the policy field of family planning, foreign investment attracting and 
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so on. The advantage of this approach is obvious that the promotion and punishment based on 
the completion of targets is an effective incentive to push local government officials to realize 
governmental functions. The disadvantage, however, cannot be ignored. When competing for 
political promotion, local officials tend to turn a blind eye to those “win-win” opportunities of 
regional cooperation, and might even engage in the “down to the bottom” competition in order to 
attract foreign investment. In the situation of information asymmetry, local governments enjoy a 
huge vacuum to manipulate information, allowing positive news to go up to superior government 
but burying negative news within their own jurisdiction. What is worth, local governments might 
infringe on legitimate rights and break laws to fulfill the targets. How can we understand the 
rules governing the target responsibility system? 
1. Formal Rules Concerning Plan Implementing. 
The legal effect of targets and the plan comes from the plan itself. It is written in the 11th 
FYP that, “Binding targets in this plan has legal effect.” Furthermore, the State Council’s 
implementing measures of the 11th FYP (No. 29 [2006] issued by the State Council) identify in 
detail the responsible departments, the criteria of targets disassembling, information disclosure 
procedures and the evaluating approach. Some scholars argue according to the above rules that 
the binding targets in the 11th FYP have sanction effect on government and failure to complete 
the targets is breach of law.7 Such opinions raise a question. Does the target in the 11th FYP have 
such a hard power?   
2. Practical Force of the Target Responsibility System. 
Three perspectives can be introduced to analyze the practical force of the target 
responsibility mechanism; time, hierarchy and people.  
 Firstly, the power of the target responsibility mechanism is obscure in terms of time. In 
China, the term of the FYP is not consistent with the term of the administration. For example, the 
10th FYP (2001~2005) is between the 9th Administration (1998~2003) and the 10th 
Administration (2003~2007); the 11th FYP (2006~2010) sits between the 10th Administration 
(2003~2007) and the 11th Administration (2008~2013). That means, one administration is 
making plan and targets for its successive administration. It is questionable which administration 
should be blamed if the targets fail to be realized. 
Secondly, the power of the target responsibility mechanism is obscure in terms of 
hierarchy. As aforementioned, the targets have been disassembled from the central government 
down to the basic local government. The question is whether the superior government should 
take responsibility if inferior government fails to reach the requirement of the targets. If not, that 
means only the basic local government is the responsible entity; if so, how can central 
                                                        
7 Hao Tiechuan, “Do China’s Plan for National Economic and Social Development Have Legal Effect?””, Seminar 
on Legalization of China’s Central Local Relationship, Beijing , 6 Jan, 2007, pp. 135-140. 
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government take responsibility as a whole? 
Lastly, the power of the target responsibility mechanism is obscure in terms of the 
liability of individual officials. If the targets fail to be realized, should the official take the 
personal responsibility or the governmental entity take the collective responsibility?  
None of the above questions can gain any answer in accordance with the current legal 
framework and administrative system in China. Incomplete responsibility system provides 
opportunities for local officials to take strategic actions. Local governments confront different 
targets simultaneously among which targets concerning energy conservation and major pollutant 
control are in conflict with the GDP growth target under the current statistical system. On one 
hand, local governments need to strictly control the scale of new projects to reduce energy 
consumption and protect the environment; on the other hand, local governments need to spend a 
large amount of money reconstructing the current projects of high energy consumption or 
pollution. Facing the strong incentive of economic development and even survival, the 
ambiguous target responsibility system does have a long way to go to match the legal power in 
words.  
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
An empirical research on the making and implementing process of the targets concerning 
energy conservation and pollution control in China’s 11th FYP shows that, (1) the target making 
is a central-government-centered top-down process, in which provincial governments have little 
space to express their real considerations based on the formal rules; (2) the target implementing 
is a process in which the pressure is conducted down to the bottom, level by level, along the 
administrative hierarchy through the target responsibility mechanism bearing no practical legal 
effect. The planning system concerning national economic and social development is still 
standing out of the legal system. Plan failure is partly resulted from the above two factors. 
 As to policy implications, two suggestions are proposed. 
The first suggestion falls on the planning system itself. Since the plan of national 
economic and social development is taking and will take a significant position in China’s 
political, economic and social management, it is necessary to legalize the planning system. Using 
the legal way to regulate the planning process means much more than legalizing the current 
practice. It is crucial to identify the central-local governmental relationship in the planning 
making process in which local governments should give more voice to their feelings. What is 
more, a functional coordination mechanism needs to be established to deal with conflicts 
between central targets and provincial targets. Finally, the planning approach should be 
improved per se: (1) a scientific and democratic reasoning should be attached to the targets; (2) 
central government should make sure that local governments get resources allocated together 
with their responsibilities; (3) a more transparent and practical responsibility system should be 
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established. 
The second suggestion is about the way of promoting China’s sustainable development. 
Sustainable development cannot solely depend on planning measures or even on administrative 
measures. Resisting force against change embedded in a bureaucratic system will distort 
exogenous institutional development. When the idea of “governance” has been accepted as 
global consensus, more and more attention on sustainable development should be paid to an 
economic approach, legal measures and the energic civil society.                 
 
